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Abstract—It is important to analyse the privacy impact of
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) rules, in order to understand
and quantify the privacy-invasiveness of network monitoring
services. The objective in this paper is to classify Snort rules
according to the risk of privacy violations in the form of leaking
sensitive or confidential material. The classification is based on a
ruleset that formerly has been manually categorised according to
our PRIvacy LEakage (PRILE) methodology. Such information
can be useful both for privacy impact assessments and automated
tests for detecting privacy violations. Information about poten-
tially privacy violating rules can subsequently be used to tune
the IDS rule sets, with the objective to minimise the expected
amount of data privacy violations during normal operation. The
paper suggests some classification tasks that can be useful both
to improve the PRILE methodology and for privacy violation
evaluation tools. Finally, two selected classification tasks are
analysed by using a Naïve Bayes classifier.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is important to analyse the privacy impact of Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) rules, in order to understand and
quantify how privacy invasive use of network intrusion detec-
tion systems can be. The objective in this paper is to classify
Snort rules according to the risk of privacy violations in the
form of leaking sensitive or confidential information. This can
subsequently be used to enhance the data privacy handling
of intrusion detection systems and also to tune IDS rule sets
to minimise the amount of data privacy violations that can
be expected during normal operation. Such classification can
be useful for example for corporate Privacy Ombudsmen to
quantify the potential privacy impact of a given IDS rule set
during privacy impact assessments [1]. It can also be used for
automated test tools to estimate the privacy impact of a given
IDS rule set.
We use the PRIvacy LEakage (PRILE) methodology intro-
duced in [2] for manual categorisation of the Snort community
ruleset. This paper extends the analysis by investigating some
indicators in PRILE that hopefully can be used both to improve
the methodology and for automatic classification of Snort
rules.
This paper is organised as follows: The next section covers
an introductory data analysis which gives motivation for the
classification problems. Section 3 gives a brief introduction
the PRILE methodology and how we performed manual cate-
gorisation of Snort rules. Section 4 describes the analysis part,
which points out some classification tasks and analyses two of
Term Occurrences
porn 21
p2p 19
yahoo 12
multimedia 10
talk 9
streaming 4
sex 6
google 5
vp-asp 2
weather 2
Table I
TOP TEN TERMS ONLY IN RULES WITH SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PRIVACY.
Term Occurrences
overflow 743
netbios 430
icmp 120
xss 114
rpc 128
injection 92
indexu 80
backdoor 80
exploit 148
web-attacks 51
Table II
TOP TEN WORDS ONLY IN ATTACK DETECTION RULES WITH SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT ON SECURITY.
the tasks by using a Naïve Bayes classifier. Section 5 discusses
related work. Section 6 contains conclusions and future work.
II. INTRODUCTORY DATA ANALYSIS
We performed an introductory data analysis of the IDS rules
by storing them in a relational database and then used data
mining to analyse them. This was useful both to understand
the classification problems covered in this paper better, and to
get more insight into how the data had been classified in the
PRILE case study [2]. It was also useful as quality assurance
of the manually classified data, in order to detect errors and
inconsistencies in the data. We did amongst others do an
introductory term frequency analysis of the classified data.
Some results from this introductory analysis are discussed in
the next section as motivation for using reinforcement based
machine learning for classifying the data and also for giving
a broader understanding of what a privacy violation consists
of.
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Tables I and II show the top ten terms only occurring in
the alert message field of Snort rules for privacy violating
and attack detection rules respectively. The tables contains two
columns:
• The first column describes the Term or word;
• and the second column describes the number of rules that
this term Occurs in.
The privacy violating rules in Table I trigger on actions
that can be considered inappropriate by corporate computer
security policies, like surfing for pornography (21 rules) or
sex (6 rules). Many rules are devoted to monitoring peer-
to-peer (P2P) traffic (19 rules). It also includes commonly
used services provided by Yahoo (12 rules), Google (5 rules),
weather services (2 rules) or the VP-ASP shopping cart
program (2 rules). There are also several rules that can detect
downloading of multimedia files (10 rules) and streaming of
such files (4 rules). The multimedia rules include detecting
common multimedia file extensions like .smi, .rt, .rp, .rmp,
.ram, .wmf and .emf. Even though there is only one rule for
each of these multimedia file types, the rules have a very broad
scope and report on any activity involving such files on a
specific port or a range of ports.
Table II shows terms for security related rules. These rules
are designed to detect attacks on critical infrastructure. Typical
attack terms include buffer overflow (743 rules), Cross-Site
Scripting (XSS) (114 rules) SQL injection (92 rules) backdoor
(80 rules), exploit (148 rules) and web-attacks (51 rules). In
addition, there are many terms related to attacks on commonly
used services or critical infrastructure like Netbios (430 rules),
RPC (128 rules) and IndexU (80). ICMP attack related and
informational messages are also included here (120 rules). It
is not expected that ICMP messages will have a significant
privacy impact, and they are useful for network managers to
detect abnormal network events reported, like for example
server or network unavailability (ICMP destination unreach-
able).
This shows that there clearly are some terms in the alert
message field indicating that some IDS rules are policy rules
focused at identifying illegal use according to some IT policy,
whereas other rules are related to detecting attacks on hosts or
other network units. The next section will go more in detail
on PRILE indicators that are required to perform automatic
classification of IDS rules.
III. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PRILE
The Snort ruleset we base our classification experiments on,
was categorised manually based on our PRILE methodology
for IDS rules. The methodology and summary results of the
manual categorisation of the Snort rules is described in [2].
Snort was selected as our case, because it is a popular IDS
system used by large public and private organisations, and
it contains a comprehensive set of IDS rules available for
free. We presume that the PRILE methodology can be used
as a gold standard for categorising IDS rules and that our
manual classification follows the methodology sufficiently
well. It should however be noted that a larger manual study
involving PRILE evaluations from several experts is needed
in order to provide more objective results. We used the Snort
community ruleset containing 3669 rules [3]. This paper
aims to investigate some classification tasks in PRILE, which
are useful both to improve the methodology and as a first
step towards implementing automatic tools for testing privacy
leakage from IDS rules.
The aim of our evaluation methodology is to provide
a gold standard for evaluating the privacy impact of IDS
rules. Privacy leakage is defined as the fraction p = rs of
exposed communication sessions r that are not attack related
to all communication sessions s. An IDS rule signature R is
considered to consists of two main parts:
• a protocol specific part used to address a specific message
in a given protocol;
• and an attack distinguishing part, which aims at matching
one or more attack patterns as described by a software
vulnerability.
In our experiments, we have chosen a maximum exposure
percentage of p = 1%. This exposure percentage can be
measured directly for a given IDS case or it can be estimated
for a rule set based on knowledge about the size of the
attack distinguishing pattern x in bytes, the maximum amount
of payload inspected per session bmax and a measured or
estimated occurrence frequency f of the attack distinguishing
pattern in ordinary data sessions. The formula for calculating
the maximum exposure percentage is then p = bmaxfx . As
a rule of thumb, attack distinguishing patterns should at least
cover 3 bytes, and not be a commonly used term, as indicated
in [2]. Furthermore, we have defined a 5 level scale for privacy
leakage (PRILE) that focuses on how wide scope the privacy
violation has. The privacy leakage scale is defined below:
0 None - no privacy leakage expected from the IDS
rule.
1 Vulnerability - the IDS rule models attacks based on
a known vulnerability in a specific way. This means
that the IDS rule can be expected to expose less
than a given percentage p of all user sessions being
investigated by it.
2 Program file - more than p percent of all sessions tar-
geted at a given program file as part of an application
are being monitored.
3 Application - more than p percent of all sessions
targeted at a given application or service are being
monitored. An application is presumed to consist of
several program files.
4 Platform - more than p percent of all sessions
targeted at a given platform are being monitored.
For example monitoring of specific files or file types
across all services for a given operating system.
5 Policy - The IDS rule is applied on network-wide
level and is not necessarily relevant from a secu-
rity perspective. It is defined to monitor or control
usage of services being monitored. For example,
monitoring use of end-user services like chat, instant
messaging, VoIP, email or web.
Furthermore, the PRILE methodology gives different priority
to privacy and security for different service classes:
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• End-user and system services: Must not be privacy leak-
ing.
• System administration and unexpected services: Security
has priority over privacy, i.e. may be privacy leaking.
The enumerated scale from 0 to 5 can then be used for quan-
titative measurements of privacy invasiveness. Furthermore,
we define a privacy violating rule as a rule that leaks more
information than level 1. That means that level 2, 3, 4 and 5
IDS rules are privacy violating by definition.
We have also defined some qualitative test criteria for the
PRILE methodology, which goes beyond what we are able to
present in this short paper. For a more thorough introduction
to PRILE, see [2].
The PRILE methodology presumes that it somehow is
possible to differentiate between the protocol specific part
that typically is repeated for every normal data session and
the attack specific part(s) of an IDS rule’s detection patterns,
which presumably only triggers during attacks.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Privacy Leakage Level Classification
No privacy leakage (level 0) can for example occur for
rules detecting protocol violations or denial of service attacks
that are not expected to happen from normal user behaviour.
Rules categorised as level 0 in the PRILE test include traffic
on port 0, loopback traffic on the internet, same source and
destination IP, IP reserved bit set, SYN to multicast address,
other protocols than TCP and UDP in IP datagrams, undefined
ICMP code, empty UDP packets and UDP flooding. These
rules detect anomalistic behaviour. It should be possible to
detect such behaviour, for example based on knowledge about
limitations and boundaries of the TCP/IP protocol suite, or by
using some kind of learning system.
Vulnerability specific rules (level 1) can be expected to
expose less than a given percentage p of all sessions being
monitored by it. This can be measured directly for a given IDS
system, provided that a representative input data set exists. If
that does not exist, then it is possible to estimate p based on
knowledge about the size of the attack specific pattern and
knowledge or presumptions of the occurrence frequency of
the attack specific pattern in the input data. It would therefore
be very useful to be able to automatically classify parts of the
IDS rule pattern as either attack specific or protocol specific.
Privacy violating rules for program file, application or
platform respectively (levels 2,3 and 4) means that the rule
is privacy violating. It exposes more than p percent of all
sessions. The classification task is then to determine whether
the rule belongs to either of these three categories.
Policy specific rules will for example not be security relevant
in the sense that they aim at detecting a specific vulnerability.
The problem is therefore how to differentiate between policy
specific IDS rules and attack rules.
This discussion has identified the following classification
tasks in PRILE that need further investigation:
1) How to differentiate between policy specific rules and
attack rules.
2) How to classify the service type of an IDS rule into the
groups System administration, System service, End-user
and Unexpected.
3) How to detect rules with no privacy leakage, which
means how to identify protocol and service anomalities.
4) How to identify the attack specific part(s) of an IDS
rule’s detection patterns.
5) How to classify the scope of an attack as either program
file, application or platform.
We only cover the first two classification tasks in this short
paper. Future work involves a more comprehensive study.
B. Classification as policy specific rules or attack rules
Potential indicators of a policy specific rule (PRILE level
5) are:
• Lacks authoritative external references to vulnerability
databases like Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE)1 or Bugtraq2 in the reference: attribute of policy
specific rules.
• The alert message (msg:) attribute may indicate policy
specific rules, as discussed in section II.
• The classtype: attribute in Snort rules may indicate policy
specific rules.
This initial study will use a Naïve Bayesian classifier, in order
to investigate some of the promising indicators. We chose a
Bayesian classifier for these introductory experiments, because
it is a simple classifier that often works well [4]. A feature
extractor extracts a feature set from the potential indicators
listed above.
The rule pattern is not considered in this simple analysis,
but may be included in a more comprehensive study later. The
manually categorised rule set was used as a gold standard.
We divided the set of rules by random, uniform selection into
two parts - a training data set and an experiment set, each
containing 1834 rules. We did not use a tuning data set, to
get as many policy rules as possible included in each sample.
This is because the level 5 policy rules are sparsely distributed
in the rule set. Also, we did not perform any ad-hoc changes
to the feature extractor that would warrant using a separate
tuning data set.
The training and experiment sets were randomly reshuffled
between the tuning sessions to avoid testing for idiosyncracies
[5]. We used the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) to classify
the data sets [6].
The experiments show that contrary to our expectations,
the references: rule attribute is a poor classifier for policy
violating IDS rules. Although the overall accuracy seemed
high (97.0%), all the level 5 policy specific rules were mis-
classified. The high accuracy can be explained by the low
occurrence frequency of policy specific rules (only 114 rules),
which means that if all of them were misclassified, this would
still give an accuracy of around 97%. Also, even though most
of the external references were empty for the policy rules (98
out of 114 policy rules) and the remaining 16 rules were URL
1http://cve.mitre.org
2http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1
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Attack rule Policy rule
Attack rule 1770.0 ± 6.0 6.3± 1.7
Policy rule 8.0± 2.1 49.7± 5.3
Table III
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR CLASSIFICATION OF POLICY SPECIFIC RULES
USING THE classtype: ATTRIBUTE.
End-user Sysadm. Syst. srv. Unexp.
End-user 1129.9 ± 13.3 0.0 12.7± 4.0 1.4± 0.8
Sysadm. 70.6 ± 5.6 35.7± 3.8 9.7± 2.8 1.1± 0.7
Syst. srv. 0.1± 0.2 0.1± 0.7 490.3 ± 11.5 0.7± 0.8
Unexp. 0.3± 0.4 1.2± 3.5 59.5± 7.4 20.7 ± 4.6
Table IV
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR SERVICE GROUP CLASSIFICATION USING PORT
NUMBER AS CLASSIFIER.
references to non-authoritative sources, the problem is that a
significant amount of attack rules also lack external references
(717 rules) which confuses the classifier. Similar tests ruled
out using words in the alert message (msg:) field as a useful
classifier, since it was not able to identify any policy specific
rules correctly.
However, the Snort classtype: attribute works better. It
manages to achieve an accuracy of 99%. The confusion matrix
in Table III shows average number and standard deviation of
correctly and incorrectly classified rules from an ensemble
of 100 experiments. The row in the table refers to the gold
standard and the column refers to test values. The Naïve Bayes
classificator manages to on average correctly identify 49.8 of
57.7 sampled policy rules (86% precision) and misclassifies
8 of the policy rules as attack rules (14%). On average 6.3
of the sampled attack rules are misclassified as policy rules
(89%).
The most informative feature of the classtype attribute
was, perhaps not surprisingly, the class policy-violation. The
sampled set of policy violating rules was too small to conclude
on the ranking of other classtypes containing policy violating
rules. However several other classes contain some rules man-
ually categorised as policy rules. It would be an advantage for
the precision of this classifier to have a larger set of IDS rules
to train on.
C. Service group classification
This test aims at classifying the service type of an IDS rule
into the groups System administration, System service, End-
user and Unexpected. Potential indicators of type of service
include:
• Sender and receiver port number in the rule;
• Alert message (msg:) attribute of the rule.
Our experiments show that the port number is a significantly
better service group classifier than the alert message. The port
number classifier gives an accuracy of 91%, whereas words in
the alert message field only gives 86%. The confusion matrix
for service group classification using a Naïve Bayes classifier
is shown in Table IV. The row in the table refers to the gold
standard and the column refers to test values. The table is
based on average and standard deviation from an ensemble
of 100 experiments. The table shows that End-user services
are classified with a precision of 99%, but are sometimes also
wrongly classified as a System service (1%).
The classifier does not work so well for System adminis-
tration services, which only has a precision of 31%. System
administration services are most often confused with End-user
services (60%) and occasionally also System service (8%) and
Unexpected (1%). The main reason for this, is that a service
definition only based on port-numbers is not able to correctly
classify system administration services running over ports that
are normally used by End-user or System services. An example
of a service that would be wrongly classified, is web-based
system administration or application management interfaces.
The next classifier recognises System services precisely
(99.8%). However, rules for Unexpected services are very
unprecise with only 25% correctly classified. They are in 73%
of the cases wrongly classified as System services and in the
rest of the cases either as System administration or End-user
services. Rules for Unexpected services target backdoors, bad
traffic, DDOS attacks, exploits, shellcode and BOT traffic. One
possible explanation is that this is a deficiency in the feature
extractor. If a port that for example is not assigned by IANA
is being used, then perhaps it would be better to only consider
this port instead of both ports, since the other port may be a
system service. It could also be related to the methodology or
manual classification, so this needs further analysis.
V. RELATED WORK
This paper is an extension of an earlier work where we
developed the PRILE methodology and did a case study
where the Snort community ruleset was manually evaluated
[2]. New contribution in this paper is an analysis of different
classification problems from the PRILE methodology and
experimental analysis of two of these classification problems
by using the existing case study as a gold standard. There
is as far as we know no other attempts at classifying the
privacy leakage from IDS rules. There are however similar
scoring systems in the security domain, for example The
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), which is an
industry standard metric for the characteristics and impacts
of IT vulnerabilities [7]. This score is useful to indicate
the security relevance of a given IDS rule. It has also got a
confidentiality indicator which measures the level of potential
confidentiality loss from a vulnerability. However, CVSS does
not cover the potential confidentiality loss that can occur from
IDS monitoring activities.
One slightly related area, is anomality-based privacy intru-
sion detection using learning algorithms like dynamic bayesian
networks [8]. However this conceptual system aims at detect-
ing internal attacks on databases for stealing large amounts of
data, which is quite different from our objectives.
Another related area is privacy enhanced intrusion detection
systems. The BRO IDS [9] for example supports a way to
anonymise the payload of a packet instead of removing the
entire payload [10, 9].
There also exists some earlier work on privacy-enhanced
host-based IDS systems that pseudonymises audit data and
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performs analysis on the pseudonymised audit records [11,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. However neither of these go into detail
on how the privacy impact of existing IDS rule sets can be
reduced.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents work towards classification of privacy
leakage in IDS rules. The PRILE methodology is a general
methodology that should be applicable to any IDS sytem. We
have identified five general classification tasks that should be
analysed in the PRILE methodology and have analysed two
of them based on a Naïve Bayes classifier. A limitation is that
the analysis in this paper is Snort specific. However some of
the results may still be transferrable to other IDS systems, for
example the port based classifier for service categories. The
paper also identifies the classtype attribute of Snort rules as
a good indicator for discriminating between attack rules or
privacy violating rules.
The underlying methodology, PRILE, is still in its infancy,
so a larger study involving more experts would be required to
achieve an objective view of what consists a significant privacy
leakage from IDS systems, and to agree upon a set of common
quantitative and qualitative indicators of privacy leakage. This
also involves doing a more extensive analysis to cover the
remaining classification tasks. This opens up the possibility
for automated test tools that can estimate the privacy impact
of a given IDS rule set.
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